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Explaining the Politics of Immigration: Dictatorship, Development, and Defense

Abstract

When making immigration policy choices, officials' hands are not tied by supposed economic or demographic necessities or by domestic or international norms. The links between migration and security are understudied and the conventional wisdom holds that democracies adopt liberal immigrant admissions policies. We should expect the opposite: dictatorship, along with economic development and large-scale security threats, tends to increase immigration. Meanwhile, the empirical content of the immigration literature tends to be limited to case studies of Western democracies. I propose a theory that explains both contemporary cross-national variation in and the macrohistorical patterns of immigration policymaking. The article includes original econometric results.

I. Introduction

Contemporary immigration policy choices are puzzling. Although people prefer living in a democracy, there is large-scale immigration into rich dictatorships. We live in an age of globalization, but most countries regulate and restrict immigration. It is widely accepted that free trade is beneficial and states have formed international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), in order to remove barriers to trade. But no equivalent of the WTO exists in the realm of immigration and international law does not recognize the right to enter another country. Furthermore, immigration policies are more restrictive now than they were in prior historical periods.

In spite of the importance and puzzling nature of immigration outcomes, key aspects of immigration policymaking are understudied. The literature has overstated the extent to which international and domestic norms and supposed economic and/or demographic necessities constrain immigration policymaking. Meanwhile, within international political economy, migration is studied much less than trade. International security scholars have, until recently, tended not to examine the links between security and migration. Comparative politics scholars usually examine the immigration policies of Western democracies while largely ignoring immigration policymaking under dictatorship. To the extent that these issues are studied, the conventional wisdom is that democracies adopt liberal immigration policies and that immigrants are, especially since the 9/11 attacks, regarded as potential security liabilities. I argue that we should expect the opposite: both dictatorship and large-scale security threats, along with economic development, increase immigration. The theory I propose explains both contemporary cross-national variation in and the macrohistorical patterns of immigration policymaking. The

statistical findings presented in this article are original because large n cross-national testing has been rare in the immigration literature.

In Section II, I describe my argument in detail. In Section III, I review the immigration literature. In Section IV, I describe how my theory accounts for macrohistorical immigration policy trends and in Section V, I describe the econometric results. Section VI concludes.

II. How Development, Regime Type and Security Shape Immigration Outcomes

International migration is the movement of people across international borders for the purpose of an extended stay (i.e., more than one year). I specify the determinants of a country's overall openness to immigration: the extent to which its population or labor force is made up of permanent or temporary immigrants. Whether a state will be open to immigration is a function of its regime type, level of economic development, and exposure to interstate threats.

i. Economic Development

Economic development increases both the supply of and the demand for immigrants. The supply logic is that of the relative income hypothesis.¹ The decision to migrate is driven by the difference between expected future earnings at home and at the destination country. However, because migration is costly, a person is not necessarily willing to migrate to any country where wages are higher than at home. The costs of migration may include the cost of travel, of learning a foreign language and of severing links with home country family and friends. Because of these costs, migration between countries with similar levels of economic development is likely to be limited.

Economic development also increases the demand for immigrants. Unemployment tends to be lower in developed economies than in developing economies. Unskilled labor is scarce in

developed countries, which are rich in physical and human capital. Low unemployment and the relative scarcity of unskilled labor increase the demand for immigrant workers.

ii. Regime Type

Like economic development, regime type variation affects both the supply of and the demand for immigrants. In contrast to the effects of economic development, the supply and demand effects of regime type move in opposite directions. Moving from a democracy to a dictatorship decreases the supply of immigrants, while increasing the demand for them.

The logic behind the supply effect is straightforward: people prefer living under democracy to living under dictatorship. Political rights are inherently valuable. They are also a means to an end: enfranchisement leads to better treatment by the state. Therefore, migrants seek to move to countries that are rich and democratic. If the opportunities to migrate to rich democracies were unlimited, any dictatorship would have difficulty attracting immigrants. However, opportunities for immigration are scarce because most rich democracies restrict immigration. Meanwhile, rich dictatorships tend to adopt relatively permissive immigrant admission policies because of their higher demand for immigrants.

The logic of the demand effect of regime type has to do with the differential effect of immigration on wages, redistributive government expenditures and taxation under democracy and dictatorship. Dictatorships are more open to immigrants because: (1) immigration lowers wages, which benefits employers and harms the median voter in a democracy; (2) the authoritarian elite can seize some of the tax revenues generated by immigrants; (3) dictatorship reduces the size of the welfare state; and (4) dictatorships, unlike democracies, can deny immigrants access to the welfare state. I address each of these in turn, noting that both major

models of regime type—the right-wing dictatorship model and the Leviathan model—are consistent with the claim that dictatorship increases the demand for immigrants.

According to the former model, the rich (owners of capital and/or land) set policies in a dictatorship. Meanwhile, a democracy adopts policies preferred by the median voter, who is poorer than the mean voter. Dictatorships therefore adopt policies that increase the returns to capital, while democracies adopt policies that increase the returns to labor.² Assuming a standard marginal productivity of labor curve, immigration lowers wages. Lower wages benefit employers, while harming labor. Consequently, democracies seek to lower immigration, while dictatorships seek to increase it.

The claim that the authoritarian elite own tax revenues is central to the Leviathan model of dictatorship.³ The dictator has an incentive to maximize the number of taxpayers because he owns tax revenues. Immigration is one means of increasing the number of taxpayers. By contrast, in a democracy, policymakers cannot legally appropriate tax revenues for personal use.

In addition to providing a direct pecuniary incentive for dictators to encourage immigration, the dictator's ownership of tax revenues indirectly leads to more immigration because it reduces the size of the welfare state. The revenues appropriated by the dictator cannot be spent on social welfare. The claim that dictatorship reduces social welfare spending also follows from the right-wing dictatorship model. The median voter, unlike the rich, favors redistributive spending.

The extent of entitlements spending affects immigration because it determines the stakes involved in deciding whether immigrants can access those programs. Immigration of people who are relatively poor by destination country standards is not costly for destination country citizens if redistributive spending is limited. Across most of the contemporary developed world,

redistributive spending is extensive. Under these conditions, deciding the extent to which immigrants can access entitlements programs is of central importance. Dictatorships are less likely than democracies to treat access to entitlements as a non-citizens' right. They are also less likely to allow their immigrant populations to become naturalized and to access entitlements as naturalized citizens.⁴

In this regard, there are four mechanisms that increase the likelihood that immigrants will become naturalized and/or gain access to entitlements programs in a democracy: (1) electoral competition; (2) non-citizens' rights; (3) constraints against deportation; and (4) constraints against regulating marriage. First, electoral competition provides an incentive for political parties to enfranchise immigrants. Political parties seek to naturalize immigrants as means of building electoral support. A political party has an incentive to do so if its leaders believe that immigrants are predisposed to vote for that party for exogenous reasons or if they believe that immigrants will tend to vote for the party which is instrumental in naturalizing them.

Electoral competition is by definition less important in dictatorships than in democracies. Consequently, policy makers in a dictatorship have less of an incentive to enfranchise immigrants in order to prevail in elections.

Second, the protection of non-citizens' rights facilitates immigrants' access to entitlements programs directly when the courts treat access to entitlements as a non-citizens' right. Furthermore, when granted the rights of free speech and assembly, immigrants and their supporters can demonstrate en masse in the pursuit of naturalization. Such measures can provide information to political parties and policymakers about the preferences of potential future voters.

Democracy is associated with constitutional guarantees of civil and non-citizens' rights. Some rights, like free speech, are necessary for conducting contested elections. The independent

judiciary protects those rights, which renders immigrants' political activity difficult to repress under democracy.

Third, immigrants are better positioned to resist deportation in a democracy than in a dictatorship. This especially applies to mass expulsions. A mass expulsion is a discriminatory governmental action that intentionally causes large numbers of people to leave the country.⁵ Mass expulsions tend to violate the constitutions of democracies because they often violate due process and discriminate on the basis of ethnicity. As such, they are barred by the courts. Under dictatorship, these institutional constraints tend to be lacking. Dictatorships use mass expulsions and the threat thereof as leverage over immigrants. Mass deportations can target those immigrant groups that are perceived as politically troublesome or whose demographic profile is regarded as unfavorable. Immigrant groups are then less likely to demand access to entitlements for fear of being targeted.

Mass deportations from oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries illustrate these claims. The most notable deportations are those of about one million Yemenis from Saudi Arabia in 1990 and of about 350,000 Palestinians from Kuwait in 1991.⁶ As a result of those expulsions and of changing recruiting strategies of GCC countries, the share of Arabs among the expatriates in the GCC declined from about 70% in 1975 to about 30% in 1996. Correspondingly, the proportion of expatriates from Asia (e.g., India) increased.⁷ The GCC authorities prefer Asian workers to Arabs in part because the Asians have less political leverage. Arab workers were also more likely to bring their families to GCC countries. In Kuwait in 1990, 25% of the Arab expatriate population was economically inactive compared to 7% of Asian expatriates.⁸

By contrast, democracies tend to have difficulty in requiring even individuals without a legal right to stay to leave. In the United States, each deportation tends to involve a costly process.⁹ In Europe, 75% to 85% of applicants for asylum whose applications are rejected stay in the country of asylum regardless.¹⁰

Fourth, social mechanisms, most notably marriage, also facilitate naturalization in a democracy. When a non-citizen marries a destination country citizen, he will usually become eligible for destination country citizenship and receive the same rights as the other destination country citizens. Policies discouraging or forbidding marriage between the native-born and foreigners restrict both civil and non-citizens' rights. Their constitutionality is consequently open to challenges under democracy.

iii. Defense

While regime type sets the basic pattern of immigration outcomes, security motivations can prevail when a state faces a large-scale and/or persistent security threat. Encouraging immigration is a strategy that is well suited to meet such threats.

Immigration increases security in three principal ways. First, immigration raises the ceiling on the amount of goods and services an economy can produce. That is, increasing the stock of labor increases the GDP. If the military's share of the budget is higher than zero, this leads to an increase in military power.

Second, immigration boosts the destination country's ability to recruit military personnel. Immigration raises the ceiling on the maximum number of personnel the destination country can recruit. Moreover, recruiting immigrants can be more efficient than recruiting destination country citizens. The opportunity cost of joining the military is higher for destination country citizens, who tend to have more opportunities in the destination country private sector.

The third logic is that of the populate-or-perish hypothesis. If a state does not populate its territory, that territory becomes vulnerable to being seized by another state. By increasing the destination country's population, immigration makes it easier for the destination country to settle any sparsely populated areas that it claims and that other states may contest. These concerns were particularly acute in frontier states such as the nineteenth century Canada and the United States, but this logic has continued to be relevant. For example, populate-or-perish was a stated rationale behind Australia's immigration policy in the early to mid-twentieth century.¹¹

Liberalizing immigration is not the only policy that increases military power. States can provide for defense by increasing military spending. However, if a state spends too much on the military, its military power will eventually shrink because of lower productivity.¹² This is one reason why states use complementary strategies such as liberalizing immigrant admissions.

States that face large-scale security threats are particularly likely to encourage immigration in order to provide for security. A threat can be large in scale due to current intensity, high likelihood of persistence, or both. An example of a threat of high current intensity is participation in a war between great powers. Such wars involve high stakes and command the use of much of the participants' resources.¹³ Under such conditions, raising the ceiling on total production and the total number of soldiers that can be recruited are pressing issues. For example, mass mobilization creates labor shortages, which can be filled by immigrant workers.

Threats that are likely to persist are often partly the product of a state's geographic location. Some locations render a country both less vulnerable to an invasion and less capable of invading other countries. Island nations, i.e., countries with no land border neighbors, are a notable example. John Mearsheimer argues that invading across a large body of water often requires launching an amphibious assault against entrenched forces, while transporting troops,

equipment and supplies across water is a demanding logistical task. By contrast, states with continental locations and numerous land borders are, *ceteris paribus*, both at a higher risk of being invaded and better positioned to invade others.¹⁴

The other key geographic determinant of the interstate threat level is whether a state is located in a dangerous region. For exogenous reasons, some regions are more prone to interstate war than others. Threats that arise from being located in a dangerous region tend to persist because a country cannot choose to change its neighbors. In the contemporary world, interstate war has been relatively rare, with the Middle East being a prominent exception to this trend.¹⁵ States located in the Middle East consequently tend to face a higher risk of interstate war.

There are two prominent critiques of the claim that, in the contemporary world, liberalizing immigration continues to be an effective means of increasing military power. The first is the claim that nuclear weapons have reduced the need for large armies. Consequently, there is less demand for immigrants, or for anyone else, as potential military personnel. However, nuclear weapons are not a perfect substitute for armies, navies and air forces. Using nuclear weapons is an extreme measure that is only undertaken under a very limited set of circumstances. A wide range of conflicts falls short of this threshold and states continue to maintain conventional forces.¹⁶

The second critique is the claim that immigration imposes national security costs. One argument is that, since the advent of the age of nationalism, states can no longer rely on foreigners in the security realm. The claim is that immigrants are on average less patriotic than the native-born and that patriotism is a necessary prerequisite for recruitment into the military. However, a destination country reaps security benefits from immigration even if it chooses not to

recruit immigrants into the military. If the destination country only recruits the native-born it can rely on immigrants to replace them in the civilian sector.

The attacks of 9/11 have increased concerns about the relationship between immigration and terrorist infiltration.¹⁷ However, terrorism concerns can be met without lowering overall immigration. For rich countries, the supply of potential immigrants is abundant. This allows them to require more screening and accept only those immigrants who they do not consider to be potential terrorist threats. In practice, immigration into the United States has increased since the 9/11 attacks. The United States' population was 11.1% foreign born in 2000 and 12.4% foreign born in 2005.¹⁸

III. Literature Review and Alternative Arguments

A prominent demographic explanation of immigration policymaking is that countries with low birth rates must encourage immigration in order to avoid the aging of their population. A problem for the strongly stated version of this argument is the availability of alternative policies that also lower the dependency ratio (e.g., raising the retirement age). The availability of alternatives raises the question of what determines their effectiveness relative to changing the immigration policy.

Discovering rich oil reserves is perceived as an economic imperative to encourage immigration. Scholars who study oil-rich Gulf States make this argument to explain high levels of immigration into the region. Andrzej Kapiszewski argues that bringing in foreign workers was a structural imperative for Gulf States because immigrants brought in necessary technologies and human capital that were unavailable domestically.¹⁹ An alternative argument is that rapid growth due to the discovery of oil increases the demand for labor. The small local population does not provide enough labor, which necessitates encouraging immigration.²⁰

However, most migrants in the Gulf work in services and in construction—not in the oil sector.²¹ Many perform jobs, such as driving a taxi, that do not bring in foreign technologies. Meanwhile, small population size does not necessitate immigration because alternative strategies are available to meet the demand for labor. Most notably, Gulf countries reduce the size of their citizen labor force by discouraging formal employment of women.²² Finally, the example of Norway illustrates that oil revenues do not necessarily lead to high levels of immigration. Norway is a small country that derives substantial wealth from oil exports.²³ However, Norway was a stable democracy before it discovered oil and its levels of immigration are comparable to those of other developed European countries.

Several cultural or normative explanations also exist. These can be divided into those that stress domestic norms and identities and those that emphasize international norms. National identity explanations are in the former category. Citizens of ethnically heterogeneous and/or settler states adopt more permissive immigration policies because they view their country as open to diversity.²⁴ A problem for such claims is that the direction of causation is unclear. Immigration is the only cause of a country becoming a settler society, and it is one of the main causes of ethnic diversity.

Yasemin Soysal is a prominent proponent of the argument that international norms explain immigration outcomes. Soysal argues that, in the contemporary world, citizenship has lost much of its importance due to the strengthening of human rights and other international norms that render policies that discriminate against non-citizens illegitimate.²⁵

However, changes in a world-level variable such as the prevailing international norms cannot easily explain variation across countries at a particular point in time. If such variation is pronounced, an alternative explanation is necessary. While most contemporary democracies do

guarantee extensive non-citizens' rights, dictatorships with large immigrant populations tend to heavily favor citizens over non-citizens. In this article, I explain that pattern.

Other scholars, such as Gary Freeman, Christian Joppke and James Hollifield associate favorable treatment of immigrants with democracy.²⁶ However, they argue that democracy and non-citizens' rights lead to especially permissive immigrant admissions policies, which is the opposite hypothesis to the one advanced in this article. According to the liberal state hypothesis, democracies have difficulty in imposing policies, like immigration restrictions, that restrict ethno-cultural diversity.²⁷ The logic of the liberal state hypothesis includes institutional and cultural arguments. Independent courts protect non-citizens' rights.²⁸ Meanwhile, arguments over the ethnic composition of immigrant inflows are regarded as illegitimate.²⁹ Joppke argues that Western European democracies are generous towards their immigrant populations because they have a moral obligation to them, having once recruited them via guest worker programs.³⁰ However, he does not explain why a corresponding moral obligation does not lead to extensive immigrant rights under dictatorship.

The proponents of the liberal state hypothesis tend not to examine immigration policies of dictatorships. In order to assess the effect of democracy on immigration policymaking, we need to examine immigration policymaking in the absence of democracy. I provide evidence that, not only is there no expansionary bias to the immigrant admissions policies of democracies, but in fact they admit significantly fewer immigrants, *ceteris paribus*, than dictatorships. While democracy does lead to better protection of non-citizens' rights, the expansion of non-citizens' rights does not lead to more open immigrant admission policies. An analogy can be made between states deciding whether to admit immigrants and firms choosing whether to hire workers. If a firm is required to provide each worker with extensive benefits and is also unable to

fire that worker later, should it choose to do so, that firm will hire fewer workers. Likewise, states that provide extensive entitlements to immigrants, and that are unable to require immigrants without a legal right to stay to leave, admit fewer immigrants.

Other relevant arguments do not fall into categories of normative or demographic necessities arguments. One such claim is that having a common law legal system reduces the propensity to regulate. Rafael La Porta, Andrei Shleifer and their co-authors apply this claim to regulation in a variety of areas.³¹ The argument can be extended by hypothesizing that common law countries are less likely to restrict immigration.

Scholars who link immigration and the welfare state argue that extensive public-sector benefits increase the opposition to immigration.³² This article furthers the study of the links between the welfare state and immigration, in part by arguing that these links differ sharply across regime types.

Although social scientists usually do not study the immigration policies of dictatorships or link immigration and security, there are important exceptions to this pattern. James Foreman-Peck argues that dictatorships adopt permissive immigrant admissions policies that favor the rich by lowering wages.³³ I argue that the effect of immigration on wages explains only a fraction of the links between regime type and immigration. I also provide original large n testing of the effects of regime type on immigration.

The literature on the links between migration and security has recently begun to grow.³⁴ Eytan Meyers and Christopher Rudolph argue that immigration policymaking is partly driven by security concerns.³⁵ Meyers argues that war can lead to more restrictive or to more permissive immigration policies due, respectively, to increases in social conformity or increased demand for labor.³⁶ Rudolph's theory of immigration includes the threat hypothesis: that international

security threats lead to permissive immigration policies. Open immigration policies increase economic efficiency and economic gains translate into military power.³⁷ My theory also incorporates the threat hypothesis, but I modify its causal logic, integrate it into a different larger argument, and test it across many cases.

Scholars have also argued that migration affects security through its effect on social cohesion. A cultural explanation proposed by Meyers is that war increases social conformity, while the increased distrust of foreigners causes immigration restrictions against permanent immigration by culturally dissimilar immigrants.³⁸ In this article, I argue that large-scale security threats increase overall immigration. Ole Wæver and his co-authors link immigration not with national security as traditionally defined, but with societal security. They argue that immigration can be perceived as threatening to societal security: the destination country's traditional culture, language and religion.³⁹

IV. Macrohistorical Trends

In this section, I examine cross-national immigration policymaking trends over the last 300 years. Immigration policies have progressively become more restrictive because of the global trend towards democratization and because of the interaction between democratization and the cross-national increase in redistributive government expenditures. As I argue in this article, extensive redistributive spending in a democracy tends to lead to immigration restrictions. The trend towards immigration restrictions tends to be absent in three sets of cases: among dictatorships, among states that face a long-term security threat, and cross-nationally during the World Wars.

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As its name indicates, during the Age of Absolutism, most of Europe was ruled by absolute monarchs. Their budgets were dominated by military spending due to frequent dynastic wars and the increasing scale of warfare. Governmental social welfare expenditures were limited to non-existent. Absolutist monarchs tended to encourage immigration and births and to restrict emigration in order to maximize tax revenues and the size of their armies.⁴⁰

The nineteenth century witnessed a strong democratization trend. Cross-national measures of regime type become available for this period. The Polity indicator ranks countries on the scale from +10 (most democratic) to -10 (most authoritarian). The indicator's coverage begins in 1800. The average country score for that year is -6.7; for 1900 it is -0.65. While the world remained predominantly authoritarian throughout the nineteenth century, it was undergoing a strong democratization trend.

The composition and extent of government expenditures began to change in the nineteenth century. Government's share of the GDP started to grow across nations about two centuries ago.⁴¹ However, extensive social welfare spending only began towards the end of the nineteenth century. Scholars usually credit the government of Otto von Bismarck with the creation of the first welfare state.⁴²

Immigration policy was more restrictive in the nineteenth century than during the Age of Absolutism. New World states (i.e., in the Americas and Oceania) tended to encourage or tolerate immigration, but immigration into Europe became limited. European policymakers were less interested in increasing their population than during the Age of Absolutism; some states began to restrict immigration (e.g., the Netherlands in 1849). Immigration into Europe was also relatively unimportant because nineteenth century migrants tended to move from Europe to the New World.⁴³

In contrast to twentieth century trends, several nineteenth century democracies in the New World did tolerate or encourage immigration over a long period of time.⁴⁴ That was the case for three reasons. First, in the nineteenth century government spending was very limited. Consequently, entry of relatively poor immigrants was less costly for destination country citizens. Second, the United States outstripped Europe in terms of economic development. This made the United States attractive to immigrants while increasing its demand for labor. Third, during the nineteenth century, New World countries were close to the frontier stage of their histories. They were sparsely populated and competed with their neighbors over who would settle new territories first. Under those conditions, the “populate or perish” security rationale for immigration was particularly important.

During the twentieth century, the global trend towards democratization slowed down until the end of the Cold War. The world in 1989 (average country score -0.34) was not much more democratic than in 1900 (average country score -0.65). However, many developed countries did become significantly more democratic by expanding the franchise, notably by granting the right to vote to women, ethnic minorities and the poor. The post-Cold War period saw a sharp democratization trend. The Polity score for the average country increased from -0.34 in 1989 to 3.4 in 2004.

Extensive social welfare spending became the norm across the developed world during the early and mid-twentieth century. Public sector expenditures sharply increased after 1914.⁴⁵ In the contemporary world, the government accounts for a significant share of national expenditures across nations.⁴⁶

The twentieth century saw the culmination of the trend towards immigration restrictions, which became nearly universal among rich democracies. For example, by 1930, Australia, Canada and the United States all restricted immigration.⁴⁷

The twentieth century cases where a democracy encouraged immigration over a significant period of time, or when numerous countries encouraged immigration at the same time, can be explained by security motivations. The notable examples are Israel, pre-World War II France and the policies adopted cross-nationally to bring in foreign workers during the World Wars.

In the late nineteenth century and between the World Wars, France was a rare Western European country that encouraged immigration. France faced the security challenge of bordering Germany, a revisionist power. France was Germany's main competitor, but was likely to be the weaker side in a conflict partly because its population was smaller. Birth rates in France trended downward from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the beginning of World War I.⁴⁸

Security concerns led France to encourage immigration. In the 1870s, there were 800,000 foreigners in France compared to 200,000 in Germany.⁴⁹ In 1889, France passed a Nationality Law that sought to facilitate conscripting immigrants.⁵⁰ Between the World Wars, Europe was generally closed to immigration. For example, in Weimar Germany, foreign workers never exceeded 0.4% of the population.⁵¹ France, however, recruited about two million foreign workers in the 1920s. In 1931, foreigners represented 6.6% of the French population.⁵² By contrast, French immigrant admissions policies after World War II are comparable to those of other Western European countries. This is partly because France's security environment has changed and France's relationship with Germany has become stable.

In the second half of the twentieth century, Israel was a rare democracy that consistently encouraged immigration. Israel is the only country that sought to increase immigration according to all four United Nations cross-national surveys of immigration policies between 1975 and 2003.⁵³ Israel faces a particularly threatening international environment because of its often hostile relationship with its neighbors.

Encouraging immigration was systematically prevalent across countries during the World Wars and immediately following World War II. During World War I, Germany recruited foreign workers. At the end of the war, over two million foreigners were working in Germany—compared to 1.26 million in 1910. France accepted 500,000 foreign workers during World War I, while the United States allowed entry to Mexican temporary workers in 1917.⁵⁴

The reliance on foreign workers and soldiers was even higher during World War II. At the end of the war, non-Germans made up 40% of the German manufacturing workforce. More than a million Soviet citizens fought in the German military. Britain recruited colonial labor; West Indians, Africans and Asians served in the Allied forces.⁵⁵ The United States brought in Mexican agricultural laborers under the Bracero program.⁵⁶

Between the end of World War II and the early 1970s, many Western European countries launched guest worker programs. The number of foreign workers in West Germany peaked at 2.6 million in 1973; by 1970 there were 2 million foreign workers in France. Guest worker programs were discontinued across Western Europe by the mid-1970s.⁵⁷ There are three principal causes of the advent and demise of those guest worker programs. First, the post-war economic boom increased the demand for workers. Second, Cold War tensions and the threat of a Soviet invasion were higher during the decades following World War II than in the decades preceding the collapse of the U.S.S.R. The security rationale for permissive immigration policies declined in

importance by the mid-1970s.⁵⁸ Third, European policymakers falsely believed that the immigration would be temporary. By the 1970s, European policymakers learned that guest worker programs are unlikely to survive under democracy, at which time they issued proclamations renouncing all immigration.

V. Econometrics

In this section, I examine the determinants of contemporary immigration outcomes. In 2000, the population of an average Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, a club of rich democracies) country was estimated to be 8.8% foreign born. Meanwhile, an average rich dictatorship⁵⁹ had a population that was estimated to be 31.5% foreign born. I use econometrics to establish the determinants of immigration outcomes and examine whether this regime type effect and the effect of security threats on immigration are casual rather than spurious (e.g., due to oil wealth).

i. Variables and Indicators

Cross-national measures of immigration outcomes have recently become available. I use three indicators to provide for more robust testing. The measures are: (1) the percent of the population that is foreign born (World Development Indicators Online (WDI), international migrant stock indicator)⁶⁰; (2) international migrants' share of the workforce (International Labor Organization (ILO) LABORSTA data)⁶¹; and (3) net migration per a thousand inhabitants (five-year estimates, WDI data).

I do not directly measure admissions policy variation. I assume that large immigration inflows require, at a minimum, a lack of a restrictive immigration policy.⁶² Moreover, measuring immigration outcomes as opposed to regulations better captures the overall level of openness to immigration.⁶³ The immigration indicators I use are scaled by the overall size of the destination

country population or labor force. The extent to which the entry of a certain number of people affects a country's wages and government expenditures depends on that country's total population.

The immigration indicators are probably characterized by a degree of measurement error.⁶⁴ The importance of measurement error should not be overestimated for the following reasons. First, I use three different indicators. I show that the key results are consistent when any of them are used. Second, the sources of the indicators (the World Bank, UN, ILO) are reputable and their data is commonly used by scholars. Third, the key empirical results tend to be substantively large and highly statistically significant. It is highly unlikely that measurement error accounts for these results.

The first dependent variable indicator is the percent foreign born. An immigrant is someone who has crossed international borders while changing their place of residence. The vast majority of the foreign born satisfy this criterion.⁶⁵

The second dependent variable indicator is migrant workers' share of the labor force (ILO). I supplement the ILO data with Nasra Shah's data to increase the number of observations.⁶⁶ This indicator covers the 1997-2002 period.⁶⁷ When analyzing the ILO data, I average the values of most other indicators between 1997 and 2002.⁶⁸

The final dependent variable indicator is net migration. The indicator measures the net change in population due to migration (immigration minus emigration) over five year periods.⁶⁹ Net migration includes emigration, which allows us to distinguish between causes that specifically affect immigration from causes that affect openness to international flows in general (i.e., both immigration and emigration). Net migration is also a measure of migration flows, while the previous two indicators measure migrant stocks.

The main period of study is between 1980 and 2000, the period that is well covered by the dependent variable indicators. The immigration indicators contain more information about the variation across countries than about the variation across time. Hence, a cross-sectional regression is more appropriate than a time series model. When using the percent foreign born and net migration dependent variable indicators, I average the values of each independent and dependent variable between 1980 and 2000.⁷⁰

The regime type indicator is a dummy variable coded by Jose Antonio Cheibub and Jennifer Gandhi.⁷¹ A country is a democracy if its executive and legislature are elected, there is more than one party and alternation between parties in power occurs.⁷²

I use multiple measures of the interstate threat environment to take advantage of their relative strengths. The first indicator is military spending divided by the GDP. The source is the WDI.⁷³ This indicator captures a pattern whereby states increase military spending in response to interstate threats. A potential weakness of the indicator is that, when the threat level is relatively low, small-scale shifts in military spending can be affected by other determinants, such as pork-barrel politics.⁷⁴

The other set of indicators captures the effect of a state's geographic location on its threat environment. A dummy island nation variable (i.e., whether a country has zero land border neighbors) and a measure of how many land border neighbors a state has (which varies from 0 to 14) capture whether a state has a continental location. The source is the CIA World Factbook. The third indicator is a measure of whether a country is located in a dangerous region: a dummy variable for whether a country is located in the Middle East. The definition of the Middle East is the lands formerly under the British military command in Egypt.⁷⁵ An advantage of the geographic proxies is that they capture attributes of the threat environment that are relatively

permanent and hence large-scale. A potential weakness is that island nation status might reduce immigration because geographic isolation increases transportation costs. Using the data, I address this concern below.

The measure of economic development is the GDP per capita. The source is the WDI. The indicator for oil wealth is Energy Information Administration's total oil supply indicator (<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/oilproduction.html>). The indicator measures the production, in 100,000 barrels per day, of oil and natural gas.⁷⁶

The birth rate is an indicator for a demographic determinant of immigration. Another demographic indicator is the log of a country's population. I use the logarithm form to account for the diminishing marginal effects of increases in population size. The source is the WDI. Small size might facilitate immigration by reducing supply constraints.⁷⁷ Alternatively, small countries may open up to world markets in pursuit of economies of scale.⁷⁸ Finally, small countries may be particularly likely to face labor shortages.

The indicator for the nature of a country's legal system is a dummy variable for whether the CIA World Factbook lists the common law as a key source of a country's legal tradition.

The measure of civil war is the average number of civil wars per year.⁷⁹ Civil war can discourage immigration into a dangerous environment.

ii. Regression Results

The first set of regressions examines the determinants of cross-national variation in migrant stocks. The results are shown in Table 2:

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

I begin by describing the results from specifications one and four. Going from a pure democracy to a pure dictatorship increases the foreign born stock by 6.7% (e.g., a country the population of which was 0% foreign born is now 6.7% foreign born); the corresponding effect on

migrants' share of the labor force is 10.8%.⁸⁰ The effects are statistically significant at least at 90% and substantively large. Meanwhile, spending an additional one percent of the GDP on the military is associated with an increase of 1.2% in the percent foreign born and 2.9% in migrant workers' share of the labor force. Finally, economic development increases immigration: a GDP per capita increase of \$1,000 increases the percent foreign born by about 0.5% and migrant worker' share of the labor force by 0.4%.

Specifications two and five introduce the interaction between economic development and dictatorship. This allows us to separate and test for both the supply and demand effects of dictatorship. In a very underdeveloped country (GDP per capita of zero), going from a pure democracy to a pure dictatorship reduces the foreign born stock by about 3% and migrant workers' share of the labor force by about 0.6%. This indicates that immigrants are reluctant to move to poor dictatorships. By contrast, the foreign born stock of dictatorships increases at a much higher rate with development than does the foreign born stock of democracies. In a pure dictatorship, a GDP per capita increase of \$1,000 increases the foreign born stock by about 2.5% and migrant workers' share of the labor force by about 2%. The corresponding effects in a democracy are only about 0.2% and 0.3%. This divergence indicates that dictatorship increases the demand for immigrants. As a dictatorship becomes richer, at a certain point the demand effect overwhelms the negative supply effect. Meanwhile, military spending remains strongly associated with an increase in immigration.

The third and sixth specifications replace OLS with a quantile regression. A quantile regression models the approximate median, rather than the mean, of the dependent variable as a function of the independent variables. This method reduces the influence of outliers.⁸¹ When a quantile regression is used, the coefficients for economic development and its interaction with

dictatorship remain substantively important and statistically significant. The military spending effect is statistically significant in specification six while it approaches statistical significance in specification three.

The next set of regressions examines the determinants of net migration, a measure of migration flows. The results are displayed in Table 3:

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

According to the results from the first specification, dictatorship, military spending and economic development are associated with a statistically significant increase in net migration. When the interaction between dictatorship and development is introduced in specification two, its coefficient is substantively large and statistically significant. Adding \$1,000 to the GDP per capita under dictatorship adds 6.5 per a thousand inhabitants over five years due to net migration. The corresponding effect in a democracy is adding 1.1 inhabitants.⁸² Very underdeveloped dictatorships experience a net loss of 11.8 per a thousand inhabitants over a five year period. Meanwhile, the military spending effect is positive but small. A quantile regression (specification three) produces results similar to the corresponding OLS results.

To further examine the relationship between threats and immigration, I replace military spending with the geographic indicators of the threat environment. The results are as follows:

INSERT TABLE 4 HERE

The results indicate that island nation status is associated with a percent foreign born that is lower by between about 2% and 6%. The effects are statistically significant. Meanwhile, adding a land border neighbor increases the percent foreign born by between about 0.3% and 0.4%. One of the effects is statistically significant. Countries with continental locations allow more immigration, *ceteris paribus*, than countries with few neighbors. Finally, being located in

the Middle East increases the percent foreign born by between about 9% and 17%. The effects are statistically significant at 99%.

Are island nations associated with lower immigration because their isolated location increases transportation costs? The existence of large-scale emigration flows from island nations indicates that contemporary migration out of, or into, island nations is not significantly hampered by transportation costs. For example, between 1980 and 2000 the average island nation lost about four out of a thousand inhabitants yearly to net migration.

The most notable of the control variable effects is that of population size. Population has a different (positive) effect on net migration than it does on migrant stocks. The results indicate that small countries experience substantial emigration in addition to substantial immigration. Such a pattern is more consistent with a strategy of openness to international flows than with a strategy of increasing population growth (i.e., seeking to increase immigration and lower emigration). As expected, civil war is associated with lower immigration, while oil production is associated with higher immigration. However, these effects tend not to be statistically significant. The common law and birth rate effects are relatively inconsistent.

The overall econometric results are consistent with the predictions of the theory advanced in this article. Regime type, economic development and large-scale security threats are the key determinants of immigration outcomes. Purely economic and/or demographic determinants (oil production and birth rates) are not as strongly associated with immigration outcomes. This indicates that these are secondary causes of immigration rather than necessary or primary causes. That democracy reduces immigration and that national security threats increase it are opposite patterns to the ones predicted by arguments stressing norms and national identity, i.e., the liberal state hypothesis and the claim that war leads to xenophobia and immigration restrictions.

VI. Conclusions

When making immigration policy choices, officials' hands are not tied by supposed economic or demographic necessities or by domestic or international norms. Rather, the costs and benefits of encouraging or restricting immigration relative to alternative strategies are driven by regime type, economic development and the interstate threat environment.

Free movement of people across borders is the missing component of contemporary globalization because most rich countries are democracies and because the risk of interstate war has been low by historical standards. Pursuing more permissive immigrant admissions policies under democracy involves difficult tradeoffs and institutional arrangements that partially insulate immigration policymaking from the democratic process. Such tradeoffs are made elsewhere, for example in the commonly accepted practice of central bank independence. That example indicates that a similar institutional design is plausible in the realm of immigration policymaking.

Table 1: *Macrohistorical Trends: Democratization, the Welfare State, and Immigration Restrictions*

	Period	Prevailing Immigration Policy	Democracy	Welfare State
Age of Absolutism	1660-1814	encourage immigration	limited to none	none
19th Century	1815-1914	Europe: little immigration. New World: permissive	democratization trend	rudimentary
	1919-2001	restrictive except in rich dictatorships	50% of nations	full-blown

Table 2: *Determinants of Immigration Outcomes: Migrant Stocks*

Dependent Variable:	% Foreign Born			Mig. Workers/Labor Force		
	1980-2000			1997-2002		
	OLS:	Quantile:		OLS:	Quantile:	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
GDP p.c. (\$1,000)	0.46*** (4.35)	0.23*** (2.75)	0.32*** (5.74)	0.4*** (2.95)	0.34** (2.57)	0.21*** (3.03)
Dictatorship Dummy	6.7*** (3.01)	-3.2 (1.6)	-1.18 (0.9)	10.8* (1.79)	-0.55 (0.09)	-3.99 (1.33)
Dictatorship* GDP p.c.		2.28*** (9.99)	2.21*** (14.7)		1.6*** (3.41)	4.5*** (19.9)
Military Exp./GDP	1.2*** (4.76)	0.7*** (3.33)	0.2 (1.51)	2.9*** (4.31)	2.4*** (3.72)	1.1*** (4.72)
Population (log)	-1.5*** (3.34)	-0.65* (1.75)	-0.49** (1.99)	-5*** (3.9)	-4.7*** (3.85)	-1.15** (2.31)
Oil Prod. (100,000 bd)	0.09 (1.33)	0.01 (0.26)	0.01 (0.3)	0.17 (1.52)	0.16 (1.67)	0.08** (2.3)
Common Law Dummy	0.63 (0.39)	-0.46 (0.36)	1.17 (1.41)	-0.73 (0.16)	-3.09 (0.75)	0.38 (0.19)
Birth Rate	-0.17* (1.95)	-0.002 (0.03)	0.04 (0.83)	0.02 (0.07)	0.27 (0.9)	0.11 (0.78)
Civil War (per year)	-3.07 (0.91)	-1.93 (0.73)	0.15 (0.09)	-3.3 (0.29)	-4.83 (0.46)	-1.92 (0.41)
n	164	164	164	56	56	56
r ² /pseudo r ²	0.39	0.63	0.24	0.67	0.74	0.44

*** - significant at 99%; ** - significant at 95%, * - significant at 90%

Coefficients with t statistics in parenthesis.

Table 3: *Determinants of Net Migration Flows*

Dependent Variable:	Net Migration [†]		
	1980-2000		
	OLS:	Quantile:	
	1	2	3
GDP per capita (\$1,000)	1.69*** (5.94)	1.1*** (4.64)	0.87*** (5.43)
Dictatorship Dummy	11.1* (1.84)	-11.8** (2.04)	-3.96 (1.06)
Dictatorship*GDP per capita		5.4*** (8.15)	3.57*** (8.34)
Military Expenditures/GDP	1.42** (2.13)	0.22 (0.38)	0.27 (0.72)
Population (log)	1.46 (1.15)	3.56*** (3.23)	2.34*** (3.43)
Oil Production (100,000 bd)	0.19 (1.04)	0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.42)
Common Law Dummy	-2.7 (0.61)	-5.27 (1.4)	-1.7 (0.71)
Birth Rate	0.38 (1.64)	0.74*** (3.75)	0.44*** (3.44)
Civil War (per year)	-11.87 (1.29)	-8.92 (1.16)	-8.69* (1.8)
N	164	164	164
r ² /pseudo r ²	0.27	0.49	0.21

*** - significant at 99%; ** - significant at 95%, * - significant at 90%

Coefficients with t statistics in parenthesis.

[†] Net migration/1,000 inhabitants per five years (average of net migration figures for five-year periods ending between 1980 and 2000).

Table 4: *Immigration and the Geographic Determinants of Security*

DV: % Foreign Born, 1980-2000							
	OLS:			Quantile:			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
GDP p.c. (\$1,000)	0.5*** (4.78)	0.5*** (4.83)	0.4*** (4.51)	0.2*** (2.86)	0.3*** (7.17)	0.3*** (5.4)	0.3*** (9.45)
Dictatorship Dummy	8.7*** (3.97)	9.1*** (4.12)	5.3*** (2.63)	-2.99 (1.54)	-1.15 (1.13)	-1.12 (0.83)	-0.38 (0.47)
Dictatorship* GDP p.c.				2.4*** (11.24)	2.4*** (21.3)	2.2*** (14.8)	1.3*** (14.3)
Island Nation	-5.93** (2.4)			-5.3*** (2.86)	-1.88* (1.92)		
# Borders		0.31 (0.81)				0.39** (2)	
Mideast Dummy			16.8*** (7.24)				9.28*** (10.6)
Population (log)	-2.2*** (4.51)	-1.9*** (3.63)	-1.5*** (3.91)	-1.2*** (3.19)	-0.6*** (2.99)	-0.6** (2.32)	-0.4*** (3.01)
Oil Prod. 100,000 b.d.	0.16** (2.33)	0.15* (2.16)	0.07 (1.24)	0.05 (0.91)	0.01 (0.46)	0.02 (0.74)	0.01 (0.47)
Common Law Dummy	1.58 (0.9)	0.52 (0.3)	-0.83 (0.57)	0.6 (0.45)	1.64** (2.36)	1.22 (1.37)	0.78 (1.51)
Birth Rate	-0.19** (2.1)	-0.16* (1.78)	-0.13* (1.73)	-0.02 (0.3)	0.03 (0.77)	0.01 (0.16)	0.02 (0.68)
Civil War (per year)	-0.75 (0.21)	-1.74 (0.49)	-2.37 (0.77)	-0.13 (0.05)	1.31 (1.01)	0.64 (0.35)	-0.62 (0.57)
n	171	171	171	171	171	171	171
r ² /pseudo r ²	0.32	0.3	0.47	0.62	0.24	0.25	0.25

*** - significant at 99%; ** - significant at 95%, * - significant at 90%

Coefficients with t statistics in parenthesis.

Notes

¹ See, e.g., Baines, Dudley, "European Emigration, 1815-1930: Looking at the Emigration Again," *The Economic History Review* 47 (August 1994), 525-544.

² Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957); Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard, "A Rational Theory of the Size of the Government," *The Journal of Political Economy* 89 (1981), 914-927.

³ Mancur Olson, *Power and Prosperity* (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Ronald Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁴ Differences in naturalization policy choices cannot explain the finding that dictatorships have larger per capita migrant stocks. For example, naturalization has no effect on the percent foreign born.

⁵ Jean Marie Henckaerts, *Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice* (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp. 1-7.

⁶ David McMurray, "Recent Trends in Middle Eastern Migration," *Middle East Report* 211 (Summer 1999), 16-19, TB Stevenson, "Yemeni Workers Come Home: Reabsorbing One Million Immigrants," *Middle East Report* 181 (March-April 1993), pp. 15-20.

⁷ Andrzej Kapiszewski, *Nationals and Expatriates. Population and Labor Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2001), pp. 62-63.

⁸ Muhhamad Ali Al-Ramadhan, "New Population Policy in Kuwait: the Quest for a Balance in the Population Composition," *Population Bulletin of ESCWA* 43 (1995), pp. 29-53.

⁹ David Weissbrodt and Laura Danielson, *Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell*. 5th edition (Eagan, MN: Thomson/West, 2005), ch. 9.

¹⁰ Yasemine Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 24.

¹¹ James Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

¹² John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 78.

¹³ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

¹⁴ Mearsheimer, pp. 126-128.

¹⁵ See Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816-2002," *International Interactions* 30 (July-September 2004), 231-262, for a list of contemporary interstate wars.

¹⁶ Mearsheimer, p. 132.

¹⁷ Christopher Rudolph, *National Security and Immigration* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 78-82.

¹⁸ US Census Bureau, “Census Bureau Data Shows Key Population Changes Across Nation,” <http://www.census.gov>; US Census Bureau, “The Foreign Born Population: 2000,” <http://www.census.gov>

¹⁹ Kapiszewski, *Nationals and Expatriates*

²⁰ International Organization for Immigration, *World Migration Report* (Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration: United Nations, 2000).

²¹ Fred Halliday, “Labor Migration in the Arab World,” *Middle East Research and Information Project Report* 123 (May 1984), 3-10+30.

²² Kapiszewski, *Nationals and Expatriates*, ch. 6.

²³ Jerome D. Davis “International Oil: The Scandinavian Dimension” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 512 (Nov., 1990), p. 84.

²⁴ For a summary of these arguments, see Eytan Meyers, *International Immigration Policy: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 6-7.

²⁵ Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship*

²⁶ Freeman, Gary F, “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States,” *International Migration Review* 29 (Winter 1995), 881-902; Joppke, Christian, “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration,” *World Politics* 50 (January 1998), 266-293; James Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

²⁷ Christopher Rudolph, “Security and the Political Economy of International Migration,” *American Political Science Review* 97 (November 2003), p. 606.

²⁸ Joppke, p. 271.

²⁹ Freeman, “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States,” p. 884.

³⁰ Joppke, p. 271

³¹ See, e.g., Botero, Juan, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “The Regulation of Labor,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119 (November 2004), 1339-1382; Casey Mulligan and Andrei Shleifer, “Conscription as Regulation,” *American Law and Economics Review* 7 (Spring 2005), 85-111.

³² Jim Dolmas and Gregory W. Huffman, “On the Political Economy of Immigration and Income Redistribution,” *International Economic Review* 45 (November 2004), 1129–68; Freeman, 1986; Gordon H. Hanson, Kenneth Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, “Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies,” *Economics and Politics*, 19 (March 2007), 1–33.

³³ J.S. Foreman-Peck, “A Political Economy of International Migration, 1815-1914,” *Manchester School* 60 (December 1992), 359-376.

³⁴ Fiona Adamson, “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security,” *International Security* 31 (Summer 2006), 165-99.

³⁵ Meyers, pp. 14-15; Rudolph, “Security and the Political Economy of International Migration,” *National Security and Immigration*

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- ³⁶ Meyers, pp. 14-15.
- ³⁷ Rudolph, "Security and the Political Economy of International Migration," p. 66.
- ³⁸ Meyers, p. 14-15.
- ³⁹ Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 23.
- ⁴⁰ Alan Dowty, *Closed Borders: the Contemporary Assault on the Freedom of Movement* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 27-29.
- ⁴¹ Dennis C. Mueller, *Public Choice II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- ⁴² See, e.g., Gosta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).
- ⁴³ Meyers, p. 86; Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999).
- ⁴⁴ Australia and Canada tended to encourage immigration during this period, while the United States tended to tolerate it. See O'Rourke and Williamson, pp. 189-190, and Ashley Timmer and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Immigration Policy Prior to the Thirties: Labor Markets, Policy Interactions and Globalization Backlash," *Population and Development Review* 24 (December 1998): 739-71, for a historical measure of immigration policy choices across several countries.
- ⁴⁵ Carles Boix, "Democracy, Development, and the Public Sector," *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (January 2001), p. 1.
- ⁴⁶ Peltzman, Sam, "The Growth of Government." *Journal of Law and Economics*, 23 (October 1980), 209-87; Casey Mulligan and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, "Internationally Common Features of Public Old-Age Pensions, and Their Implications for Models of the Public Sector," *Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy*, 4 (2004): Article 4.
- ⁴⁷ O'Rourke and Williamson, p. 187.
- ⁴⁸ Office of Population Research, "War, Migration, and the Demographic Decline of France," *Population Index* 12 (April, 1946), pp. 73-74.
- ⁴⁹ Meyers, p. 121; Yann Moulier and Georges Tapinos, "France," in *The Politics of Migration Policies*, Daniel Kubat, Ursula Merhlander, and Ernst Gehmacher, eds. (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1979), p. 127.
- ⁵⁰ Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration* (New York: Guilford Press, 2003), p. 62.
- ⁵¹ Meyers, p. 124.
- ⁵² Castles and Miller, p. 64.
- ⁵³ United Nations. *World Population Policies* (New York: United Nations, 2003).
- ⁵⁴ Meyers, p. 36; Moulier and Tapinos, p. 128.
- ⁵⁵ Ulrich Herbert, *Hitler's Foreign Workers. Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany Under the Third Reich* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Meyers, pp. 66-67.

⁵⁶ Richard B Craig, *The Bracero Program: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971); Wilbert E. Moore, "America's Migration Treaties During World War II," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 262 (March 1949), 31-38.

⁵⁷ Castles and Miller, pp. 69-73.

⁵⁸ Rudolph, "Security and the Political Economy of International Migration," p. 610.

⁵⁹ Rich dictatorships (GDP per capita > \$4,000): Bahrain, Brunei, Gabon, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, UAE.

⁶⁰ This indicator and the net migration indicator are based on data from the United Nations Population Division.

⁶¹ Based on data from Table M2: "Employed persons by sex and by country of origin, total and migrant population."

⁶² It is difficult to explain the finding that, *ceteris paribus*, immigration into dictatorships is higher than immigration into democracies other than by referring to admissions policy. It does not appear plausible to argue that people prefer migrating to dictatorships.

⁶³ Jeanette Money, *Fences and Neighbors*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

⁶⁴ For example, for countries where the census does not ask about the place of birth the United Nations has estimated foreign born stocks using other criteria, such as nationality. See Christopher R. Parsons, Ronald Skeldon, Terrie L. Walmsley and L. Allan Winters. "Quantifying the International Bilateral Movement of Migrants," presented at the 8th Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Lübeck, 2005, p. 10.

⁶⁵ The main exception occurs when changes in international borders result in a person who was never a migrant becoming classified as foreign born.

⁶⁶ Nasra M. Shah, "Restrictive Labor Immigration Policies in the Oil Rich Gulf: Effectiveness and Implications for Sending Asian Countries," *UN Expert Group Meeting on Social and Economic Implications of Changing Population Age Structure*, 2005, p.17.

⁶⁷ I use LABORSTA data for 2005 or 2006 for three countries for which earlier data is not available to increase the number of observations.

⁶⁸ I average military spending data between 1988 (the year for which it becomes available) and 2002 to maximize the number of observations. I average the civil war indicator between 1982 and 2002 because civil wars are rare events with lasting consequences. Limiting these indicators to 1997-2002 produces similar econometric results.

⁶⁹ I averaged this indicator between 1980 and 2000 and scaled it per a thousand inhabitants using WDI population data. The estimate for 1980, which also includes data for the late 1970s, is included in the analysis in order to err on the side of not excluding information and to ensure that the indicator covers the entire 1980-2000 period.

⁷⁰ I average military spending data between 1988 and 2002.

⁷¹ Jose Antonio Cheibub and Jennifer Gandhi, "Classifying Political Regimes: A Sixfold Classification of Democracies and Dictatorships," 2004.

⁷² Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 28-29.

⁷³ I supplement WDI data with CIA World Factbook data to increase the number of observations.

⁷⁴ The positive association between military spending and immigration outcomes tends to be stronger among countries with high military spending than among countries with low military spending; it also tends to be stronger in relatively developed countries than in very underdeveloped countries (e.g. GDP per capita < \$1,000), which face serious supply constraints when they try to encourage immigration.

⁷⁵ Middle East. Encyclopedia Britannica. In *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved July 7, 2008, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: <http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9052543>

⁷⁶ When fuel exports' share of merchandise exports (WDI) is used as an alternative indicator the econometric results are similar.

⁷⁷ E.g., it is easier for small countries to find enough immigrants to increase its labor force by, for example, a quarter.

⁷⁸ Peter Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).

⁷⁹ Occasionally, multiple civil wars occur in a country in the same year. The indicator is from: Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816-2002," *International Interactions* 30 (July-September 2004), 231-262.

⁸⁰ The net effect of dictatorship is positive because in rich dictatorships the positive demand effect of dictatorship far outweighs the negative supply effect.

⁸¹ It is important to examine the influence of outliers partly because the number of rich dictatorships in the contemporary world is relatively small. On the quantile regression method, see Lawrence Hamilton, *Statistics with Stata* (Belmont, CA: Duxbury/Thomson Learning, 2005).

⁸² The corresponding yearly effects are 1.3 for dictatorships and 0.22 for democracies.